










Company directors play an important role in society.  Their activities have significant effects 
on the interests of their companies, shareholders and other stakeholders. Consequently, the law 
regards them as fiduciaries and imposes duties which set out behavioural expectations. The 
private enforcement regime is the primary mechanism adopted by many common law 
jurisdictions for securing compliance with directors’ duties. The crucial question is whether 
this regime is effective in securing enforcement of directors’ duties. This article addresses this 
question by examining the fundamental weaknesses of the private enforcement regime. In 
exploring these weaknesses, it focuses on the UK and Nigerian experience. It crucially argues 
that the private enforcement regime, due to its weaknesses, is unable to provide deterrence and 
compensatory benefits. It is therefore ineffective as an enforcement mechanism for breach of 
directors’ duties.  This article therefore concludes that there is need for a complementary 













‘Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law, but 
that are elusive to the grasp’.1 
Over the years, the issue of enforcement has been the subject of concern among several scholars 
who have tried to study the relationship between enforcement and compliance.2 More 
specifically, within the corporate context, the concern has often been the need to ensure 
effective enforcement of directors’ duties.3 This focus on enforcement is justified as absent, or 
ineffective, enforcement of directors’ duties often results in non-compliance.4  
In common law countries, such as the UK and Nigeria, the private enforcement regime for 
breach of directors’ duties are a key enforcement mechanism.  As noted by Jackson and Roe 
‘the tool of public enforcement (as opposed to fiduciary-oriented private litigation before 
judges) has not usually been strongly associated with the common law’.5 In spite of this, 
                                                          
* Author’s details and affiliation.   
1 (1922) The western maid 257 US 419,433. 
2 See Isaac Ehrlich, ‘The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement’ (1972) 1(2) the Journal of Legal Studies 
259-276; George Stigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Law’ in Gary Becker and William Landes (eds), Essays 
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment edited by (National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia 
University Press 1974).  
3 For examples see Vicky Comino, ‘The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia’ (2009) University 
of Queensland TC Beirne School of Law Research Paper No. 09-03 available at 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492516> accessed 26th June 2017; Renee Jones and Michelle Welsh, ‘Toward a 
Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight’ (2012) 45(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 343; Andrew Keay, ‘Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: A Normative Inquiry’ (2014) 43 Common 
Law World Review 89; Andrew Keay and Michelle Welsh, ‘Enforcing Breaches of Directors Duties by a Public 
Body and Antipodean Experiences’ (2015) 15(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 255. 
4 James Mayanja, ‘Promoting Enhanced Enforcement of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations: The Promise of Public 
Law Sanctions’ (2007) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 6.  
A study by Welsh on the effect of increased sanctions and enforcement activity on corporate compliance shows 
that there is a link between increased enforcement and increase in compliance. See Michelle Welsh, ‘New 
Sanctions and Increased Enforcement Activity in Australian Corporate Law: Impact and Implications’ (2012) 41 
Common Law World Review 134, 164.  Coffee similarly argues that the level of enforcement intensity could 
explain the differences in financial development between jurisdictions. See John Coffee Jr, ‘Law and the Market: 
The Impact of Enforcement’ 2007) 156(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 233.  
5 Howell Jackson and Mark Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence’ 
(2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207,237. 
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available evidence suggests that private enforcement offers very limited effectiveness.6 
Consequently, this article aims to identify and analyse the main weaknesses of the private 
enforcement regime.  
The weaknesses of the private enforcement regime have been the subject of some scholarly 
attention.7 This article however fits in, and extends, the literature on the subject by utilising a 
theoretical framework to analyse the weaknesses of private enforcement.  The theories on the 
purpose of enforcement provide a critical perspective on the effectiveness of the private 
enforcement regime. What ensues is a rich and in depth analysis of the subject.   
Throughout the course of this paper, frequent reference is made to the Nigerian enforcement 
regime. While there is a plethora of literature on enforcement of corporate law in more 
developed countries,8 in developing countries there is a dearth of scholarly opinion on the 
subject.9  Yet effective enforcement is important for developing countries, particularly 
emerging markets, such as Nigeria.  Arguably, developed countries can get by with sub-optimal 
enforcement as directors are often surrounded by a culture that discourages opportunism.10 In 
such countries, therefore, directors may routinely obey laws. However, in developing countries, 
such as Nigeria, where a bribery and corruption culture thrives,11 routine compliance with 
corporate law is unlikely to occur. Still, directors’ accountability and effective enforcement of 
directors’ breach is required for investors’ confidence.12 As noted by Millstein ‘capital does 
                                                          
6 For a discussion of the UK experience see John Armour and others, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States. (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 687,699; Andrew Keay, an Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors Breaches of Duty’ 
(2014) 33(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 76. For the Nigerian experience  see Oludara Awolalu, ‘Derivative Actions 
in Nigeria: A Case For Reform’ (2017) 28(10) International Company and Commercial Law Review 13 
7 Ibid. 
8 See footnotes 3&4.  
9 For  an in depth  discussion on enforcement of corporate law in emerging economies see  Bernard Black and 
Reiner Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109(8) Harvard Law Review 1911. 
10 Ibid 1926. 
11 See Abdullahi Y Shehu, ‘Combatting Corruption in Nigeria – Bliss or Bluster’ (2005) 12(1) Journal of Financial 
Crime 69.  
12 There are a number of studies which demonstrate that effective enforcement is essential for investor confidence. 
See Rafael La Porta & others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
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not flow to dangerous neighbourhoods’.13 Effective enforcement is therefore essential if 
Nigeria is to take its place as a future economic giant alongside other emerging markets.14  This 
paper therefore intends to influence debate, and policy change, in the area of enforcement of 
directors’ duties in Nigeria.   
This article is divided into two parts. The first part provides a theoretical foundation for the 
ensuing discussion. It starts by conceptualising enforcement. It goes on to discuss the purpose 
of enforcement of corporate law. Compensation and deterrence are identified as the key 
purposes of private enforcement of corporate law. It argues that both the deterrence and 
compensatory purposes of enforcement have their unique strengths and weaknesses. Undue 
reliance on either one can therefore produce absurd results.  
Following this, the second part analyses the weaknesses of the private enforcement regime. In 
doing so, some references are made to the UK and Nigerian corporate law regime. It discusses 
how the weaknesses of the private enforcement regime impede its ability to produce deterrence 
and compensatory benefits. It therefore crucially argues that the private enforcement regime is 
ineffective in enforcing breaches of directors’ duties. Finally some concluding remarks are 
made.  
Two notes on scope. First, private enforcement actions may be brought in respect of directors’ 
breaches in both private and public companies. This article is however particularly concerned 
with redressing breach in large public companies. In private companies, it is common for 
                                                          
Economics 3; Utpal Bhattachraya & Hazem Daouk, ‘The World Price of Insider Trading’ (2002) 57(1) Journal of 
Finance 75-108; John Coffee Jr, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ 2007) 156(2) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 233. 
13 Ira Millstein, ‘Non-traditional modes of enforcement’ in Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Three Views’ 
(Global Corporate Governance Forum Focus 3, Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank, 2005)  
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6ab71c8048a7e7b3accfef6060ad5911/Focus_ENFCorpGov3.pdf?MOD
=AJPERES>, 1 accessed 14th November 2018.  




controlling shareholders of the company to function as the directors of the company. 
Consequently, the main conflict in such companies is often between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders.15 The agency problem between directors and 
shareholders is less prominent.16  However, in larger companies, this sort of agency problem is 
often the case due to the delegation of authority which is a frequent feature of such companies. 
Delegation enables skilled managers to utilise their skills in managing a corporation even when 
they lack the wealth to invest. It also allows wealthy individuals to invest even when they lack 
the skills to manage the entity.17  However, in spite of its many benefits, delegation also creates 
room for directors to act in their own self-interests to the detriment of the shareholders.18  
Enforcement of directors’ breaches in such companies is therefore a matter of immense 
concern.  
Second, this article’s analysis of enforcement focuses specifically on directors’ statutory 
duties.19 This however does not seek to underestimate the importance of effective enforcement 
in other areas of corporate law. While directors’ statutory duties are essential to good corporate 
governance, directors nevertheless owe other key obligations to the company.20 In spite of this 
however, this article focuses on directors’ duties as much of the analysis offered in respect of 
                                                          
15 Reiner Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd 
edn, OUP 2009) 36.  
16It is crucial to note here that this does not imply that the agency problem between directors and shareholders is 
limited to public companies. Indeed, the factors that determine self-interested behaviour on the part of directors 
are quite varied.   For a discussion of the three generic agency problems that arise in companies see Reiner 
Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd edn, OUP 
2009) 35-36.  
17 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 698, 700.  
18 The severity of self-interested behaviour exhibited by directors would often depend on the extent of dispersion 
of shares in the company. In a closely-held company, there is little room for directors to make decisions that 
benefit them directly at the company’s expense. The majority shareholders have sufficient incentives to monitor 
management. However in a widely-held company, the manager’s incentive to act in a self-interested manner can 
be fully activated as shareholders may lack the incentive to monitor management. For a discussion of the problem 
created by separation of ownership and control see Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (The Macmillan Company 1932). See also David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text 
and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 171-174. 
19 See UK companies Act 2006, ss 171-177. 
20 For example directors have certain key obligations with regards to companies’ annual accounts and reports. See 
UK Companies Act 2006, pt. 15.  
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private enforcement of directors’ duties would also apply to the enforcement of these other key 
obligations.21 
  Part One: Theoretical Foundations 
This section provides a theoretical framework for the discussion of the weaknesses of private 
enforcement which is to follow. It offers an analysis of the key purpose of enforcement in 
corporate law.  
Conceptualising Enforcement   
According to Posner, enforcement of law may be described as the ‘process by which violations 
are investigated and a legal sanction applied to the violator’.22 While this definition is accurate 
in several respects, the use of the term ‘legal sanctions’ is nevertheless restrictive. Although 
sanctions are an integral part of enforcement, those sanctions need not be legal or formal.  
Enforcement can still take place with non-legal or informal sanctions. These may include 
‘reputational sanctions’,23 ‘name and shame’, ‘truthful negative gossip’, or shunning the 
offender, amongst others.24  Enforcement, then, generally involves two basic elements. The 
first is the investigative element, which entails examining and getting informed about a 
violation. The second element, sanction, connotes imposing some sort of penalty on the 
violator. These two elements ought to be present in any enforcement activity. Enforcement may 
                                                          
21 A derivative claim, for example, may be brought in respect of negligence, default, breach of duty or trust by a 
director. Hence, presumably, claims may be brought in respect of a director’s default or negligence with regards 
to a financial reporting obligation. See UK Companies Act 2006, s260(3). 
22 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th Edn, Wolters Kluwer 2014) 859. 
23 John Armour ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment’ 
in John Armour & Jennifer Payne (eds), Rationality in Company Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice (Hart 
Publishing 2009) 74. 
24 See Robert Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press 1991) 
for a discussion of the role of norms and non-legal sanctions in enforcement. 
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therefore be defined as the process of securing compliance through investigation and 
imposition of appropriate sanctions in case of breach.25 
 
The Purpose of Enforcement in Corporate Law 
Before going into the specifics of private enforcement, it is necessary to examine what purpose 
enforcement serves in corporate law. Generally, rules may be enforced for different reasons. 
The purpose of enforcement in each case would often depend on the nature of the rule being 
enforced. Criminal law, for example, may be enforced for a number of reasons. These include 
to ensure that offenders get their ‘just deserts’ i.e. retribution,26 to deter prospective offenders,27 
to incapacitate offenders,28 and to rehabilitate offenders.29 
Similarly, within the corporate context, directors’ breaches may be enforced for different 
reasons. Two key reasons have been identified in literature. These are deterrence and 
compensation.30 While deterrence is aimed at preventing re-occurrence of the wrong,31 the aim 
                                                          
25 Oludara Akanmidu, ‘The Deterrence Theory: A Case for Enhanced Enforcement of Directors’ Duties’ (2017) 
1(1), Corporate Governance and Organizational Behaviour Review 25, 26. 
26 Retributivist theory of punishment is often associated with the works of Kant and Hegel. See George Wilhelm 
Hegel (1832), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, (T. Knox (tr, Clarendon Press 1952) para 100; I Kant (1976), The 
Metaphysics of Morals, (Mary Gregor tr, Cambridge University Press 1991) 140.  
27 The deterrence theory is credited to the works of early philosophers Beccaria and Bentham. See Cesare Beccaria, 
On Crimes and Punishments (Jane Grigson tr, Marsilio publishers 1996) 50; Jeremy Bentham, ‘An Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ in the works of Jeremy Bentham published under the superintendence 
of his executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh volume 1). Modern deterrence theory is credited to Gary Becker. See 
Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ in Gary Becker and William Landes (eds), Essays 
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (National Bureau of Economic Research 1974). 
28 See Andrew Von Hirsch, ‘Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons’ 
(1972) 21 Buffalo Law Review 717 for a discussion of preventive incapacitation.  
29 See Francis Cullen & Karen Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation (2nd edn, Routledge 2015).  
30 Several scholars have argued that compensation and deterrence are the main rationale for the various 
enforcement mechanisms in corporate law. Cox, for example, argues that compensation and deterrence are the 
‘joint missions’ of shareholder suits. See James Cox, ‘The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits’ (1999) 65 
Brooklyn Law Review 3, 8.  Similarly, Coffee notes that from a policy perspective, securities class actions have 
two potential rationales: compensation and deterrence. See John Coffee Jr, ‘Reforming the Securities Class 
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implication’ (2006) 106(7) Columbia Law Review 1534, 1539.  
31 See Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence (Elsevier 1975) 2. 
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of compensation is to, as much as possible, restore the victims to their previous position.32 It 
must however be noted here that deterrence and compensation are not the only purposes of 
enforcement in corporate law. Retribution may, in certain cases, be considered a purpose of 
enforcement in corporate law. Directors’ disqualification, for example, encompasses both 
protective (deterrence) and punitive (retributive) components.33  Similarly, there is often a 
public desire for retribution in respect of directors’ misconducts, which affects the public’s 
interests. A prime example is the UK banking crisis, which brought with it a strong desire for 
retribution by aggrieved members of the public. This desire for revenge was actualised in the 
vandalization of the Edinburgh home and car of the former CEO of RBS, Sir Fredrick 
Goodwin, by a vigilante group called ‘bank bosses are criminals’.34 The need for retribution 
may therefore in certain cases influence enforcement of corporate law. Having said that, 
however, retribution remains a secondary purpose of enforcement in private law and, by 
extension, corporate law. Therefore, the focus in this article would be deterrence and 
compensation.   
Deterrence versus Compensation 
                                                          
32 John Darley and Thane Pittman, ‘The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice’ (2003) 7(4) 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 324, 325. 
33 See Pearlie Koh, ‘Punishment and Protection – The Disqualification of Directors in Singapore’ [2013] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 447-456.  See also the English decision of Re Cladrose ltd [1990] BCLC [208] 
where the court disqualified only the chartered accountant and not the director because the latter was ‘very much 
less blameworthy’. 
34 The attack came in the wake of statements by Max Hastings in the Daily Mail where he stated that ‘the time 
has come to address the entire robber banker culture’. See Max Hastings, ‘Seize their Porsches and throw them in 
jail! Shameless bankers are worse than Train Robbers’ (Daily Mail 23rd March 2009) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1163623/MAX-HASTINGS-Seize-Porsches-throw-jail-Shameless-
bankers-worse-Train-Robbers.html 23rd march 2009> accessed 8th March 2018. See BBC, ‘Sir Fred Goodwin's 
home attacked’ 25th March 2009    
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7962825.stm> accessed 8th March 2018.    
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Having identified deterrence and compensation as the main purposes of enforcement of 
corporate law, a pertinent question however remains. Which of these - compensation or 
deterrence - represents the primary purpose of private enforcement of corporate law?  
This question is particularly important where private enforcement is concerned. With the public 
enforcement regime in corporate law, the focus is often on public benefits in terms of enhanced 
deterrence and overall improved corporate governance. Public enforcers are by nature often 
concerned with the public value of enforcement.35 They are therefore less likely to be 
concerned with the compensatory value of enforcement.36 Consequently, it can be argued that 
with the public enforcement regime, the primary purpose of enforcement is deterrence.  
The situation is however quite different with private enforcement as its primary purpose is not 
often clear. Consequently, differing opinions have been offered on the matter. Cox, for 
example, argues that within the context of shareholder suits, compensation represents the 
primary purpose of enforcement.37 He argues that courts are generally more concerned with 
the compensatory aspects of shareholder suits rather than its deterrent effect.38 Similarly, 
shareholder suits are often dismissed if the plaintiff is unable to establish some harm suffered 
by the company as a result of the directors’ misconduct.39 He therefore maintains that the public 
role or social value of shareholder suits is subdued. Consequently, the compensatory, rather 
than deterrence, rationale is the main justification for shareholder suits.   
                                                          
35 Mayanja, (n 4) 11. 
36 This is not to say that corporate regulators are never concerned with securing compensation for victims. Rather, 
the argument here is that they are primarily concerned with public rather than private interests. A key example of 
a public enforcer that considers compensation orders as a key part of its enforcement arsenal is the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission. See Corporations Act 2001, s1317H.   
37 James Cox, ‘The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits’ (1999) 65 Brooklyn Law Review.   
38 ibid 11. 
39  ibid 8.  
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Coffee and Schwartz however disagree with Cox’s viewpoint and argue that deterrence should 
be the primary purpose of shareholder suits, specifically derivative actions.40  They argue that 
while the courts have customarily assumed that a compensatory purpose underlies derivative 
actions, this can no longer be the case. The relationship that now exists between the shareholder 
and the company makes the compensatory rationale obsolete. They however argue that 
derivative actions are ‘naturally adapted’ to a deterrent purpose.41 Consequently the main 
accomplishment of derivative actions, or class actions, is not that they result in significant 
compensation, rather that they can provide real deterrence.  
 In the same vein, Coffee argues that deterrence is the only rationale that justifies the significant 
costs imposed on investors and the judiciary by class actions.42 He argues that from a 
compensatory perspective, class actions are unjustifiable as investors often recover only a small 
share of their losses. Likewise, most institutional investors who suffer losses do not submit 
claims in securities class actions. He however goes on to argue that despite its failure as a 
compensatory mechanism, class actions can still provide effective deterrence.43  
The conflicting opinions on the primary purpose of private enforcement actions demonstrate 
the key tensions between both sides of the debate. While the argument in support of the 
compensatory rationale of private enforcement has its merits, it must be said that there are 
several reasons why the compensatory purpose cannot reasonably be regarded as the primary 
purpose of private enforcement in corporate law. Three of this will be examined here.  
The first reason relates to the difficulty with adequately compensating victims of wrongs 
committed by directors. Compensation involves the award of a sum of money to a claimant for 
                                                          
40 See John Coffee and Donald Schwartz, ‘the Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for 
Legislative Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261,302 – 305.  
41 ibid.  
42 See John Coffee Jr, ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implication’ (2006) 
106(7) Columbia Law Review 1534, 1536 – 1547.   
43 ibid 1547. 
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losses suffered.44 One of the key problems with compensation as the key purpose of private 
enforcement, however, is the difficulty with identifying and adequately compensating the 
victims of directors’ breaches. This difficulty becomes more acute where the company is a 
widely held company with hundreds or perhaps thousands of shareholders. In such companies, 
share ownership changes very frequently such that those who own the shares at the time of 
wrongdoing are unlikely to be the same owners at the time of recovery.45  
Similarly, while the interests of the company and that of the shareholders are often considered 
synonymous as evident by the ‘no reflective loss’ rule,46 injury to the company is not always 
the same as injury to the shareholders.47 Indeed, the shareholders’ losses may even exceed that 
of the company. In addition to this, even when the total amount recovered from an enforcement 
action is substantial; the amount that accrues to any individual shareholder is unlikely to be 
significant based on individual shareholding.48 Consequently, shareholders can hardly be said 
to have been compensated for their losses. Furthermore, other than the shareholders of the 
company, directors’ breaches may also cause loss to other stakeholders such as creditors, 
                                                          
44 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, OUP 2004) 29. 
45 Coffee and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit’ (n 40)302. 
46 The basic rule of reflective loss is that a shareholder cannot recover a loss which is only ‘reflective’ of the 
company’s loss. Where a shareholder suffers loss in respect of wrong done to the company, such loss is said to be 
a ‘reflective loss’. Only the company may sue in respect of that loss. Consequently, a shareholder cannot sue in 
respect of reduction in the value of his shareholding where that merely reflects the loss suffered by the company 
which can be remedied by the company itself enforcing its rights against wrongdoers.. See Johnson v Gore wood 
[2002] 2 A.C 1.  The ‘no reflective loss’ principle is aimed at preventing ‘double recovery’ by the shareholder as 
well as ‘double jeopardy’ by the wrongdoer. For a further discussion of the ‘no reflective’ loss principle see 
Charles Mitchell, ‘Shareholders’ Claim for Reflective Loss’ [2004] Law Quarterly Review 45; Joyce Lee Suet 
Lin, ‘Barring Recovery for Diminution in Value on the Reflective Loss Principle’ (2007) 66(3) Cambridge Law 
Journal 537; Brenda Hannigan, ‘Drawing Boundaries between Derivative Claims and Unfair Prejudicial Petitions’ 
(2009) 6 Journal of Business Law 606. See also John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in 
the Theory of Company Law (OUP 1993) 76-77. 
47 Indeed, the possibility that a shareholder could suffer a loss which is ‘separate and distinct’ from that of the 
company was recognised by Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore wood [2002] A.C 35. 
48 Coffee and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit’ (n 40) 304. 
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employees, customers,49 and members of the public.50  In such cases, it will be difficult to 
identify, or fully compensate, all the victims.  
The second reason relates to the very nature of the compensatory remedy. As mentioned earlier, 
compensation is generally intended to reimburse for losses suffered. Where no loss is suffered, 
compensation is generally inapplicable. Consequently, an acceptance of compensation as the 
primary purpose of private enforcement would imply that enforcement is unnecessary in 
situations where the company has not suffered any loss from directors’ breaches. It is therefore 
only when the company has suffered a loss that such breaches should be enforced. This 
approach is however questionable. In reality, it is quite possible for a director to breach his 
duty without causing actual loss to the company. An example would be directors’ breach of 
duty to exercise powers for the purpose for which they have been conferred.51 This duty 
operates to limit directors’ authority and, potential, abuse of power.  This remains so even if 
their actions are carried out in what they genuinely believe to be the best interests of the 
company.52 A breach of this duty therefore requires enforcement even where the director’s 
actions has not caused any tangible loss to the company. Hence, if compensation is considered 
the primary purpose of private enforcement in corporate law, a suitable defence for wrongdoing 
directors in such situations would be that their breach has not caused any loss to the company 
or indeed that the company has gained from the breach.53 
                                                          
49 An instance where a director’s breach may cause loss to customers is where substandard or even harmful goods 
are sold to customers in order to increase the company’s profits.  
50 The global financial crisis provides a classic example of cases where directors’ breaches had far-reaching 
consequences on members of the public.  
51 Companies Act 2006 s171(b). 
52 It is important to point out that the ‘proper purpose’ duty has been enforced by the courts even in circumstances 
where directors are not motivated by self-interest. This is particularly true with regards to the power to issue 
shares. See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821.  
53 See generally James Cox, ‘Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit 
Procedures’ (1983) 52 George Washington Law Review 745-788. 
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The third and final reason why compensation cannot reasonably be regarded as the primary 
purpose of private enforcement is that the central theme of corporate law and corporate 
governance is the reduction of agency costs and problem.54 The basis of the agency problem is 
the assumption that the interests of principals and agents diverge.55  Consequently, the agents 
(directors/managers) do not always make decisions that are in the principal’s (shareholders) 
best interests.56 Managers may misuse their managerial power for personal financial benefits 
or make decisions that are detrimental to the company’s overall interests.57 A general concern 
of corporate law has therefore been how to align the manager’s interests with the shareholders 
thereby ensuring that the company is run in its best interests. This arguably has at its core a 
need to deter managers from acting in their own self interests.  
Despite the many arguments against compensation as the primary purpose of private 
enforcement, it must be said that the deterrence purpose is not without its own flaws. Two key 
problems have been identified here. 
The first problem is that the deterrence theory58 itself is subject to several criticisms. We discuss 
some of those criticisms within the corporate context.  The deterrence theory is based on the 
cost-benefit approach to decision making.59 It is argued that people would often choose that 
course of action which offers greater individual benefits than costs. Deterrence theorists assume 
                                                          
54 See Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.  
55 Charles Hill & Thomas Jones, ‘Stakeholder Agency Theory’ (1992) 29(2) Journal of Management Studies 131, 
132. 
56 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (4th edn, Wiley 2013) 9. 
57 Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edn, OUP 2013) 17. 
58 On the mislabelling of the ‘deterrence doctrine’ as a ‘theory’, see Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and 
Deterrence (Elsevier 1975) 5-9. This term ‘deterrence theory’ would however be used in this article as it is the 
most used term. 
59 Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ in Gary Becker and William Landes (eds), 
Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York 1974) 9. 
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that human beings are ‘self-interested, rational and reasoning’ creatures.60 Therefore, all things 
being equal, a person would commit an offence if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility 
he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities.61 Consequently, an 
increase in the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment reduces the utility 
expected from the offence. This invariably reduces the number of offences committed.62  
The first issue with the applicability of the deterrence theory is that it assumes that potential 
wrongdoers can distinguish between right and wrong behaviour and make a choice between 
both alternatives.63  However, if the law does not clearly define ‘wrongful behaviour’, then the 
deterrence theory cannot apply as this choice between right and wrong conduct can no longer 
be made.64 Scholars argue that corporate law does not clearly define the sort of conducts that 
will amount to a breach.65 The boundaries are therefore blurred and vague. Directors’ duties, 
for example, are written in broad terms such that directors may not immediately realise that 
their actions constitute a breach.66 If directors do not realise that their actions constitute 
misconduct, they will not engage in any rational evaluation of attendant costs and benefits.67  
                                                          
60 Raymond Paternoster, ‘How much do we Really Know about Criminal Deterrence?’ (2010) 100(3) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 765, 782; David Pyle, The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement (Macmillan 
1983) 10. 
61 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’ (2000) 38(1) 
Journal of Economic Literature 45, 47.  
62 See further Brian R Cheffins, ‘Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation’ (OUP 1997) 199. 
63 Kirk Williams and Richard Hawkins, ‘Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review’ (1986) 
20(4) Law and Society Review 545, 546-547. See also Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law (Foundation 
Press 2004) 97. 
64 Lisa M Fairfax, ‘Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director –Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty through Legal 
Liability’ (2005) 42 Houston Law Review 393,434 
65 ibid. It is noteworthy that Directors duties in the UK Companies Act 2006 are codified in general terms by way 
of statement of principles.  The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission considered the case for codifying 
directors’ duties in more detailed terms. However, due to the risk of loss of flexibility, a more broad and general 
approach was adopted. This however leaves the duties open to various interpretations thereby impairing 
accessibility by directors. See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Company Directors; Regulating 
Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties’ (CP 153) para 14.14;  Law Commission and Scottish 
Law Commission, ‘Company Directors; Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties’ 
(1999) Nos 261 & 173 para 4.48.  
66 For example will a director be liable for breach of duty due to failure to attend board meetings? What if they 
attend and don’t ask questions or fail to ask the right amount of questions? 
67 Geraldine Szott Moohr, ‘An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime’ 
(2003) 55 Florida Law Review 937, 959-961. 
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In response to this criticism, however, it can be argued that case laws provide sufficient 
information regarding which kinds of behaviour constitute breach of duty.68 Similarly, 
corporate governance principles exist which create greater clarity. Directors therefore have 
sufficient guidance on the behaviour expected of them.  
The second issue lies with the ability of legal sanctions to deter director misconduct. Several 
scholars question the ability of legal sanctions to deter. For example, Braithwaite and Makkai 
in their empirical study found little support for the deterrent effect of certainty or severity of 
punishment on compliance.69 Robinson and Darley were also particularly sceptical of the 
deterrence theory. They argued that potential wrongdoers rarely know the law, cannot calculate 
the expected costs and benefits of their actions and do not make rational self-interested 
decisions.70 Similarly, Toby argues that punishments are unnecessary because the 
‘socialisation’ process prevents most deviant behaviour.71  
In spite of this, however, it is important to point out that most scholars who question the 
effectiveness of deterrence focus on ordinary offenders. These criticisms do not properly apply 
to the type of persons who occupy directorship positions.  Indeed, one can argue that the 
deterrence theory is more applicable to upper and middle class individuals than those in the 
lower class.72 According to Geerken and Gove, ‘the effectiveness of the deterrence system will 
increase as the individual’s investment in and rewards from the social system increases’.73  
                                                          
68 Fairfax (n 64) 435-436. While this claim is made within the US context, it remains applicable as there is a 
significant body of case law on the subject of directors’ duties and liabilities in the UK.  
69 John Braithwaite and Toni Makkai, ‘Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence’ (1991) 25(1) 
Law and Society Review 7.  
70 Paul Robinson and John Darley, ‘The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its 
Worst when doing its Best’ (2002-2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 949, 953. 
71 Jackson Toby, ‘Is Punishment Necessary?’ (1964) 55 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science 
332,333. 
72 Michael Geerken and Walter Gove, ‘Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations’ (1975) 9(3) Law and 
Society Review 497,509. 
73 ibid 509. 
17 
 
Hence, persons who are future oriented and think of factors like their career and family are 
usually more concerned with the consequences of their misconducts. Directors fall into this 
category. Similarly, directors are, on average, likely to be people who are well educated and 
informed.74 Their position would often require them to make rational and well-reasoned 
business decisions on a daily basis. Directors’ actions, and indeed misconducts, are also often 
motivated by economic considerations.75 They therefore belong to the category of rationally 
minded people who can calculate the costs and benefits of their actions as required by the 
deterrence theory.76   
In further support of this, an empirical study by Welsh suggests that enforcement activities by 
ASIC, the Australian corporate and securities regulator, act as a deterrent for potential 
offenders.77 The interviews conducted by Welsh particularly reveal that the James Hardie case 
had a considerable impact on compliance as some of the interviewees stated that it encouraged 
them to review their compliance policies.78 Consequently, despite its many criticisms, the 
deterrence theory remains applicable to enforcement within the corporate context.   
Having resolved the first problem, we move on to the second problem with the deterrence 
purpose of enforcement. Although legal sanctions can deter wrongdoing, as discussed above, 
it is sometimes difficult for private enforcement actions to meet this deterrence ideal. 
Deterrence generally depends on a wide range of factors.79 A key factor that determines the 
deterrent effect of enforcement actions is the substance of the claim brought against the 
                                                          
74 Renee Jones, ‘Law, Norms and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate 
Governance’ (2006) 92 Iowa Law Review 105, 148. 
75 Sanford Kadish, ‘Some Observations on the use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations’ 
(1963) 30 (3) The University of Chicago Law Review 423, 426. 
76 Chambliss argues that the deterrence theory will particularly apply to white collar offenders as they are not 
committed to a life of crime. See further William Chambliss, ‘Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal 
Sanctions’ (1967) Wisconsin Law Review. 
77 Michelle Welsh, ‘New Sanctions and Increased Enforcement Activity in Australian Corporate Law: Impact and 
Implications’ (2012) 14 Common Law World Review 134-166. 
78 ibid 161. 
79 See Gibbs ‘Crime, Punishment and Deterrence’ (n 31) 524; Becker (n 27) 9.  
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wrongdoer and the manner in which it is perceived by the public.  Hence, the deterrent, and 
reputational, impact of a private enforcement action will be weak and limited if it is perceived 
as a frivolous internal dispute.80 This, as will be discussed further below, can often be the case 
with private enforcement actions thereby effectively preventing it from offering deterrent 
benefits.  
Similarly, directors rarely suffer out-of-pocket losses from shareholder litigation. Armour and 
others in their study found that it is rare for both outside and inside directors to face out of 
pocket liability in litigation arising under corporate law.81 Companies often purchase directors’ 
and officers’ liability insurance (D & O insurance) for its directors and officers against liability 
for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company.82 
Consequently, directors rarely contribute to settlements in shareholder suits as insurers often 
cover the settlement and litigation expense.83  Damages claims could also be dealt with through 
insurance which implies that the ultimate penalty payer might be the shareholder or consumer 
rather than the wrongdoers.84 While D & O insurance will not indemnify directors from liability 
arising from dishonest, fraudulent or criminal conduct,85  they nevertheless still offer 
significant protection. This arguably reduces the deterrent effect of private enforcement and 
casts doubts on its efficacy as such. 86   
                                                          
80 James Cox, ‘The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits’ (1999) 65 Brooklyn Law Review 3, 6. 
81 John Armour and others, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: an Empirical Comparison of the United 
Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687, 709-710. See also Tom 
Baker and Sean Griffith, ‘Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ 
Liability Insurance Market’ (2007) 74(2) University of Chicago Law Review 487,487-488. 
82 UK Companies Act 2006, s233. 
83 Coffee, ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action’ (n 42)1550-1553 
84 Vanessa Finch, ‘Personal Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 887.  
85 Jonathan Mukwiri, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in the UK’ (2017) 28(4) European Business Law Review 
547-550. 
86 It is commonly argued that D & O insurance increases the danger of ‘moral hazard’ and reduces directors’ 
incentives to pay close attention to their duties. See K.G Jan Pillai and Craig Tractenberg, ‘Corporate 
Indemnification of Directors and Officers: Time for a Reappraisal’ (1981) 15 University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform 101, 119; Finch (n 84) 888.   
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Overall, the varying opinions on the primary purpose of private enforcement actions in 
corporate law reveal the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the divide. Both the 
compensatory and deterrence purpose suffer from certain weaknesses. While some of the 
scholarly opinion on the subject relates to particular enforcement mechanisms, specifically 
shareholder suits, the arguments put forward are generally applicable to the private 
enforcement regime. Crucially, it is worth noting that private enforcement actions in corporate 
law cover a wide range. Hence, neither deterrence nor compensation will always apply across 
board as the key purpose of private enforcement. Indeed, undue reliance on either rationale can 
produce ‘absurd results’.87 Some sort of balance in both the compensatory and deterrence 
rationale therefore remains essential for effective enforcement. Consequently, in appraising the 
effectiveness of the private enforcement regime, the main question to consider should be 
whether it is able to properly meet a deterrence and/or compensatory purpose.  
 
Part Two: The Private Enforcement Regime  
The previous section has highlighted deterrence and compensation as the central purposes of 
enforcement of corporate law. In order for the private enforcement regime to fulfil these 
purposes at least two conditions must be in place. First, the enforcement regime must be put to 
effective use by private enforcers. The effectiveness of an enforcement regime depends not just 
on its availability, but also its use. Hence, where enforcement mechanisms are not put to use, 
they offer little, or no, benefit. Second, enforcement activities must be accompanied by 
reasonable probability of success. Where attempts to use an enforcement regime are met with 
                                                          
87 Coffee and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit’ (n 40)308. Pure reliance on a deterrence rationale 
would justify litigation even where the costs far outweigh any potential recovery. Similarly, reliance on the 
compensatory rationale would permit the wrongdoers to keep the proceeds of their misconduct as long as the 
company has been adequately compensated.  
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minimal success, they are likely to be of little benefit. Hence, where neither of these conditions 
is in place, an enforcement regime would be unable to meet its purposes.  
The private enforcement regime for breaches of directors’ duties encompasses various 
enforcement proceedings. These include corporate actions, derivative actions, unfair prejudice 
actions, and actions by insolvency practitioners. Corporate law literature is replete with in-
depth discussions of these enforcement proceedings.88  This article does not intend to repeat 
what has already been said in that regard. Rather the focus in the ensuing section is an analysis 
of the core weaknesses of the private enforcement regime. The discussion in this section will 
reveal how the weaknesses of the private enforcement regime undermine its ability to offer 
deterrence and compensatory benefits and render it ineffective in enforcing breaches of 
directors’ duties.  
Weaknesses of the Private Enforcement Regime 
In this section, we shall focus on six weaknesses of the private enforcement regime.  
1. Information Asymmetries  
According to Reisberg, information is the ‘lifeblood’ of litigation.89 This is hardly an 
exaggeration as information is central to every litigation process.90 Consequently, its 
availability, or absence, on the part of either party to the case can determine the outcome of a 
litigation process. Similarly, enforcement of a standard requires not only information regarding 
                                                          
88 For discussions of the various private enforcement actions see Jennifer Payne, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies 
Reassessed’ (2004) 67 Modern law review 500; Andrew Keay & Joan Loughrey, ‘Something Old, Something 
New, Something Borrowed: An Analysis of the New Derivative Action Under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 
124 Law Quarterly Review 469; Andrew Keay, an Assessment of Private Enforcement Actions for Directors 
Breaches of Duty’ (2014) 33(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 76.  
89 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (OUP 2007) 85. 
90 Litigants very often adjust their strategies in response to new information. A Party may therefore make the 
decision to settle in response to certain information in the hands of the other party. See Joseph Grundfest and Peter 




the standard but also information about its breach.91 Hence where potential enforcers lack 
necessary information, enforcement is practically impossible. This is often the case with private 
enforcement proceedings as discussed below.  
i. Shareholder Actions 
The extent to which private enforcement proceedings are affected by information 
asymmetries92 is dependent on the nature of the enforcement mechanism. The information 
asymmetry problem is however particularly evident with shareholder actions such as derivative 
proceedings. Shareholders frequently lack sufficient information about directors’ misconducts. 
This problem is particularly severe in public listed companies which are often ‘widely-owned’ 
making it impossible for the shareholders to be directly involved in the company’s 
management.93 Shareholders of such companies are generally unable to gain access to full 
information about several issues,94 they therefore ‘labour’ under information asymmetries.95 
This makes enforcement inherently difficult.  
The information asymmetry problem is attributable to the fact that directors generally 
determine the type of information that shareholders receive. Shareholders do not have a general 
right to information about the company’s affairs other than that which the company is 
statutorily required to disclose.96 They also often have limited rights with respect to inspection 
                                                          
91 Vanessa Finch, ‘Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1992) 55(2) The Modern Law Review 
179, 180. 
92 Information asymmetry exists where one party has an informational advantage over another. Milgrom and 
Roberts distinguish between complete information, incomplete information and information asymmetry. See Paul 
Milgrom and John Roberts, ‘Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Organization’ (1987) 
77(2) American Economic Review 184, 184-185.  
93 Widely’ owned means that ownership is in the hands of very many shareholders, each of whom likely owns 
only a small proportion of the total share capital. 
94 Giles Proctor and Lilian Miles, ‘Unresponsive Shareholders in Public Companies: Dial “M” For Motivate?’ 
(2000) 21(5) Company Lawyer 142,143. 
95 William Bratton and Michael Wachter, ‘The Case against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 158 (3) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 653, 666. 
96 Julian Velasco, ‘The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder’ (2006) 40(2) U.C Davis Law Review 407,420. 
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of company documents and indeed have no right to inspect certain company files.97 Therefore, 
whilst shareholders may obtain some information from the companies’ annual reports and other 
official statements, these sources of information are often inadequate for the purpose of 
enforcement.98 Where the profit and loss account reveals poor performance; it will not identify 
the particular businesses or transactions that resulted in that poor performance.99  Opportunities 
to ask questions at the annual general meeting are also of little use in these instances.100 Cases 
of directors’ malpractice are therefore not likely to be brought to the members’ attention. 
Similarly, auditors owe no duty to investigate management’s effectiveness or to comment on 
business decisions made by directors. Therefore, even auditors are unlikely to be a good source 
of information about managerial misconduct.101  
In addition to this, directors are, generally, aware of the amount of harm caused by their 
misconduct while shareholders do not possess this information.102 Shareholders are therefore 
often in a weak position to assess the strength of their claim against directors.103 The 
information required by shareholders to build a strong case is also likely to be in the directors’ 
hands.104 This creates significant difficulties for potential litigant shareholders.105  
                                                          
97 Shareholders statutory rights to inspect company documents are very specific and limited. Hence, shareholders 
do not have a general right to inspect the minute of board of directors’ meetings or the company’s accounting 
records.  See UK Companies Act 2006, ss 116, 229, 238, 358 & 423.  
98 These sources of information will not provide a claimant shareholder with the evidence needed to bring a 
lawsuit. See further L.C.B Gower, ‘Some Contrasts between British and American Corporations Law’ (1956) 
69(8) Harvard Law Review 1369, 1387.  
99 Parkinson (n 46) 243;  Fischel and Bradley argue that the lack of access to relevant information makes it difficult 
for minority shareholders to judge which management actions are wrongful or contrary to the company’s interests. 
See Daniel Fischel and Michael Bradley, ‘the Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: 
A Theoretical Empirical Analysis’ (1985) 71 Cornell Law Review 261,273. 
100 Parkinson (n 46) 245. 
101 ibid 244. 
102 Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance’ (n 89) 86. 
103 Joseph Lee, ‘Shareholders Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006: Market Mechanism or 
Asymmetric Paternalism?’ (2007) 18(11) International Company and Commercial Law Review 378,390. 
104 Where the board of directors are unwilling to take action against a wrongdoing director, they would be 
uncooperative in releasing information required by the shareholder in order to bring a derivative action.  
105 Joan Loughrey, ‘Privileged Litigants: Shareholder Rights, Information Disclosure and Corporate Privilege’ 
[2007] Journal of Business Law 778. 
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Consequently, shareholders often suffer from severe ‘informational disadvantages’106 which 
deters them from litigating and reduces their chances of success where they choose to do so.  
ii. Corporate Actions 
As discussed above, shareholders suffer from information asymmetries, it is however worth 
considering whether the board also experiences this problem. Where the board is considering 
instituting corporate action against a wrongdoing director, one would be safe to presume that 
all the board members would possess the information required to vote in favour of, or against, 
litigation. This is however not necessarily the case as evidence suggests that information 
asymmetries often exist between executive and non-executive board members.107 Non-
executive directors are generally outsiders who work part time and spend limited time at the 
company. They would therefore often have less knowledge and information about the business 
in comparison to their executive counterparts.108 In light of this, they must rely on the 
information provided by the CEO who usually has superior knowledge about corporate 
matters.109  
The information asymmetry that exists within boards of directors may result in the concealment 
of information regarding a director’s misconduct from other members of the board. This will 
be particularly so where the wrongdoing director is the CEO or a key member of the board.110 
Even where information regarding the misconduct is disclosed to the board, it might be 
presented in a manner designed to hide the true extent of the misconduct or, indeed, elicit the 
                                                          
106 Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance’ (n 89) 86. 
107 Reggy Hooghiemstra and Jaap Van Manen, ‘The Independence Paradox: (Im) Possibilities Facing Non-
Executive Directors in the Netherlands’ (2004) 12(3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 314. 
108 See John Roberts, Terry McNulty and Philip Stiles, ‘Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-
Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom’ (2005) 16 British Journal of Management s5, s13. 
109 The results of an empirical study by Hooghiemstra and Manen demonstrate that non-executive directors face 
significant limitations due to the information asymmetry that exists in boards. See Hooghiemstra and Manen (n 
107) 314.  
110 Ramirez argues that CEO primacy exists. He argues that CEOs of public corporations are generally very 
powerful and possess significant power on the board. See Steven Ramirez, ‘The Special Interest Race to CEO 
Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 345, 385-386.  
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desired response from the non-executive directors.111 Therefore while non-executive directors 
are expected to approach issues more objectively than executive directors, and are in a better 
position to make litigation decisions, they will be unable to do this if they lack relevant 
information. 
Consequently, while shareholders generally suffer from information asymmetry, the board of 
directors is not spared of this problem. Information asymmetry is therefore a significant 
weakness which either discourages private enforcement actions or, where such actions are 
instituted, reduces the chances of success. It therefore has an incidental effect on the ability of 
the enforcement regime to produce deterrence and compensatory benefits.   
 
 
2. The Incentive Problem  
The second weakness of the private enforcement regime is the incentive problem. This problem 
affects the various private enforcement mechanisms in different ways. Overall, however, it has 
the effect of dissuading private parties from bringing enforcement actions. First we consider 
corporate actions.   
i. Corporate Actions 
Power to bring legal proceedings on the company’s behalf is generally vested in the board of 
directors.112  Hence, where there has been a breach by a director, or any other party, the board 
                                                          
111 Hooghiemstra and Manen (n 107)317.  
112 See Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London & Suffolk Properties Ltd [1989] BCLC 100 where Harman J held 
that the decision to commence litigation is included in the power granted by Article 80 of Table A to directors to 
manage the business. See also Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Control of Corporate Action’ (1989) 52 Modern 
Law Review 401. Note that in the UK Table A of 1985 has been replaced by the Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations 2008/3229 for companies registered on or after the 1st October 2009.  
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has the power to institute corporate action against the offending party.113 In spite of this 
litigation power however, boards generally lack the incentive to bring corporate actions against 
fellow directors.114 This is due to several inter-related reasons. Three of these would be 
examined here. 
The first reason why boards generally lack the incentive to bring private enforcement actions 
against wrongdoing directors is loyalty ties. Directors often develop friendship and loyalty ties 
to each other similar to those found among family members or members of a society.115 Such 
friendship relations are governed by norms which require individuals to care for each other’s 
welfare and come to each other’s aid when needed.116 Hence, boards of directors who have 
developed friendship ties among each other are naturally inclined to protect fellow directors’ 
rather than subject them to litigation.117 This applies irrespective of fault on the part of the 
wrongdoing director or whether or not the director remains a member of the board.  Members 
of the board are therefore for this reason generally unlikely to have the incentive to sue fellow 
directors.118  
The second reason why boards lack the incentive to bring action against other directors is the 
group think syndrome.119 Boards of directors are often affected by group think. Boards 
                                                          
113 See CAMA, s 63(3) which provides that the board of directors may exercise all the powers of the company 
except those which have been expressly vested by the in the general meeting. 
114 It has long been accepted by corporate law scholars that members of a board generally have poor incentives to 
sue fellow directors. Dent, for example, argues that both inside and outside directors cannot be expected to act 
independently in making the decision to sue a fellow director. See George Dent Jr, ‘The Power of Directors to 
Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit’ (1980) 75 Northwestern University Law 
Review 96, 110-118. Similarly Scott argues that people generally lack the motivation to sue themselves. See 
Kenneth Scott, ‘Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance’ (1983) 35 (5) Stanford 
Law Review 927, 940. 
115 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 591. 
116 Mady Wechsler Segal, ‘Varieties of Interpersonal Attraction and Their Interrelationships in Natural Groups’ 
(1979) 42(3) Social Psychology Quarterly 253,254. 
117 Patton and Baker argue that directors generally value each other’s friendship and want to keep their seats on 
the board. They are therefore likely to treat shortcomings by other directors in an indulgent manner. See Arch 
Patton and John  Baker, ‘Why won’t directors rock the boat’ (1987) Harvard Business Review 10, 10-11. 
118 Ibid. 
119 The group think theory was developed by Irving Janis. See Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A 
Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Houghton Mifflin 1972). 
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generally act as unified groups; division or failure to agree on key issues is therefore incredibly 
rare.120 As noted by Cox and Munsinger, strong psychological factors at work within the 
boardroom create a cohesive and legal in-group that will support its members for both positive 
and negative reasons.121 Members of the board may therefore unanimously decide to refrain 
from commencing litigation against a fellow director even where it is the company’s best 
interests to sue.122 Similarly, the board may ‘blindly’ agree with the opinion of a key member 
of the board who is averse to litigation. This view finds support in Hill’s empirical study where 
it was found that generally most executive and non-executive directors do not disagree with 
the CEO.123 Similarly, in an empirical study by Pettigrew and McNulty, it was noted that the 
chairman’s influence on the board can be very significant. 124 Hence, where the CEO or 
chairperson decides not to sue a fellow director, it is likely that the votes of other members of 
the board would reflect this position.125 
The third reason why board members may lack the incentive to sue a wrongdoing director is 
the need to ensure reciprocity.  Directors may refuse to litigate against a wrongdoing director 
as a means of protecting their own interest in case they fall into the same position. Even where 
they do litigate, they may fail to pursue it diligently such that the action will fail. Kershaw has 
labelled this ‘reciprocal back scratching: this time I will help you out; I hope you’ll do the same 
                                                          
120 Stephen Hill, ‘The Social Organisation of Boards of Directors’ (1995) 46 British Journal of Sociology 245, 
256.  
121 See James Cox and Harry Munsinger, ‘Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal 
Implications of Corporate Cohesion’ (1985) 48(3) Law and Contemporary Problems 83, 99.  
122 The Enron board provides a classic example of a board affected by group think. For a full discussion of this 
see Marleen  O’Connor, ‘The Enron Board: The Perils of Group Think’ (2003) 71 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 1233, 1257 -1293. 
123 Stephen Hill, ‘The Social Organization of Boards of Directors’ (1995) 46 British Journal of Sociology 245, 
269. Ramirez similarly argues that CEO primacy exists. He argues that CEOs of public corporations are generally 
very powerful and possess significant power to determine the boards’ composition. See Steven Ramirez, ‘The 
Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 345, 385-386. 
124 Andrew Pettigrew & Terry McNulty, ‘Power and Influence in and around the Boardroom’ (1995) 48 Human 
Relations 845, 857. 
125 See Rachel Fink, ‘Social Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to 
Eliminate “Rubber - Stamping” Boards’ (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 455, 464-468 for a discussion 
of loyalty and social ties in the boardroom resulting in a rubber stamping board.   
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for me if I ever find myself in such a position’.126 Directors might also refuse to vote in support 
of litigation against a fellow director as a means of ensuring that they remain in the ‘good 
books’ of the wrongdoing director. 127 This will be particularly so where the wrongdoing 
director is a key member of the board such as the CEO or chairperson.128 Similarly, directors 
often require the support of other directors on the board for resolutions; they are therefore likely 
to vote in a manner that ensures that they can always get the support of the wrongdoing director 
should they require it in the future.  
As a result of the various disincentives to corporate actions against directors, it is hardly 
surprising that such actions are often a rare occurrence.129 As mentioned earlier, in order for an 
enforcement mechanism to offer any deterrent or compensatory benefits, it must be put to good 
use. This lack of incentive to bring corporate actions against directors therefore means that this 
enforcement action is hardly used and consequently offers little benefit.   
ii. Derivative Actions.  
The incentive problem is not limited to corporate actions; it is also evident in other private 
enforcement actions. This is especially so for derivative actions.  Shareholders generally lack 
the incentive to bring derivative actions.130  This lack of incentive may be attributed to at least 
                                                          
126 Kershaw, company law in context (n 115) 591. 
127 Andrew Keay, ‘The Authorising of Directors’ Conflict of Interest: Getting a Balance?’ (2012) 12(1) Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 129, 143. 
128 As mentioned earlier CEOs and chairpersons often exercise significant influence on the board.  See text 
accompanying footnotes 123 to 125.  
129 See Richard Nolan, ‘The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-
Executive Directors Following The Higgs Report’ (2005) 6 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413,429; Deirdre Ahern, 
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Dublin University Law Journal 116. 
130 Ramsay argues that the main obstacle to shareholders contemplating bringing derivative actions is not 
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See Ian Ramsay, ‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects of A Statutory Derivative 
Action’ (1992) 15 University Of New South Wales Journal 149,150. 
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two factors. The first is the absence of direct benefit for litigant shareholders and the second is 
the free rider problem.  
The first factor - absence of direct benefit - arises from the very nature of derivative actions. 
Derivative actions are proceedings brought in the company’s name to enforce rights due to the 
company.131 The company is the real plaintiff in a derivative action. Consequently, any 
damages or other corporate recovery goes directly to the company.132 Corporate recovery 
however does not necessarily provide equivalent benefit to shareholders in form of 
compensation.133  Indeed, it may find its way back into the directors’ pockets in form of 
managerial remuneration.134 The claimant may therefore only receive an indirect benefit in the 
event that the proceedings lead to a rise in share price.135 
 Even where corporate recovery results in some sort of tangible compensation for shareholders, 
it is likely to be an insignificant amount per shareholder.  While a corporate recovery might be 
large; on a per share basis, it amounts to very little for individual shareholders.136 If all that the 
derivative action accomplishes is a few pennies per share to thousands of shareholders, it is 
difficult to justify shareholders’ efforts in bringing the action. This sort of pro rata gain for 
shareholders is not even guaranteed as a successful derivative action may lead to a reduction 
in share value due to bad publicity associated with litigation or loss of confidence in the 
                                                          
131 Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2010] B.C.C 420 [73]. 
132 Arad Reisberg, ‘Funding Derivative Actions: A Re-Examination of Costs and Fees as Incentives to Commence 
Litigation’ (2004) 4(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 345,347. 
133 In this respect Wilson argues that the fact the damages from any successful derivative action go directly to the 
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and an Application to the Shareholders’ Derivative Action’ (1985) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 
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134 Coffee and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit’ (n 40) 304.  
135 See Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance’ (n 89) 222. See further Brian Cheffins, 
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136 See Coffee and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit’ (n 40) 304.  
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directors’ abilities.137 The lack of direct benefit therefore significantly reduces shareholders’ 
incentives to bring enforcement action.   
The second factor responsible for shareholders’ lack of incentive to bring derivative actions is 
the free rider problem. Several scholars have discussed the rational apathy and free rider 
problem which exists among shareholders in the company.138 The free rider problem arises 
because shareholders who do not participate in bringing litigation, or bear any risk involved in 
litigating, will benefit from a derivative action if successful.139 While a shareholder may benefit 
from instituting a derivative action, he or she will gain more if other shareholders bear the 
costs.140 The free rider problem may therefore cause shareholders to refrain from litigating in 
order to prevent other shareholders from benefitting from their efforts or even in the hope that 
someone else will commence proceedings.141  However if all shareholders share this view, the 
likelihood of getting a shareholder to sue is quite slim.142 The incentive problem therefore 
remains one of the biggest difficulties preventing shareholders from using derivative actions as 
an enforcement mechanism. 
 
iii. Other private enforcement actions 
In addition to corporate actions and derivative actions, other private enforcement actions also 
suffer from the incentive problem. This is particularly so with regards to public listed 
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companies. Two of these are mentioned briefly here. The first is the unfair prejudice petition.143 
Shareholders of public listed companies generally lack the incentive to bring unfair prejudice 
petitions. This is due to the inadequacy of the remedy on offer. In an unfair prejudice petition, 
the default remedy often provided by the court is an ‘exit remedy’.144 This exit option is 
however undesirable to those shareholders who still desire to stay in the company and are rather 
interested in the deterrent effect of an enforcement action on wrongdoing directors. This will 
be particularly so where the misconduct has affected the company’s share value. Even where 
shareholders are interested in exiting the company, this remedy is still of limited use to 
shareholders of public listed companies who are generally much better off selling their shares 
on the market.145 The exit option is therefore generally unsuitable for shareholders of public 
listed companies.146 Consequently, unfair prejudice petitions are hardly used by shareholders 
of such companies.147  
The second enforcement action to be considered is action by insolvency practitioners. 
Corporate insolvency can prompt litigation against wrongdoing directors. Insolvency 
practitioners therefore often have authority to bring actions in the name of the company. These 
include actions against the company’s directors for breaches of duty.148 While this power exists 
in theory, in practice, liquidators rarely sue directors of insolvent companies. This is 
particularly so for public listed companies.149  In a study carried out by Armour, it was found 
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that over a 16 year period, there was only one instance in which an insolvency practitioner had 
instituted a claim against former directors of a public listed company.150 This dismal track 
record is perhaps due to the fact that in the event that the claim fails, the insolvent company 
would be required to pay the defendants’ legal costs ahead of other creditors.151 Liquidators 
are often more keen on saving the corporate estate for the creditors’ benefit rather than 
commencing enforcement action against badly behaved directors.  Therefore, while a liquidator 
may be keen on retrieving corporate assets which have been wrongfully transferred to directors, 
he is likely to be less enthusiastic in pursuing other ‘speculative’ claims like negligence against 
directors where the outcome is less assured.152 Insolvency practitioners therefore generally 
have little incentive to bring enforcement action against directors in respect of breaches of duty.  
The incentive problem is arguably the most significant weakness of the private enforcement 
regime. The private nature of this enforcement regime means that potential enforcers will often 
sue only when they believe it is in their best interests to do so. This in itself is hardly surprising, 
as the law does not compel private individuals to bring actions that are contrary to their 
interests. Thus, a person who suffers loss is not compelled to seek redress for the wrong no 
matter how offensive the conduct is to public policy.153 The incentive problem however has a 
consequential effect on the ability of the private enforcement regime to produce compensatory 
or deterrence benefits thereby impeding its effectiveness.   
 
3. Costs of Enforcement  
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Enforcement resources are generally limited. Potential enforcers are therefore expected to 
weigh the costs and benefits of an enforcement action before embarking on it.154 Consequently, 
a key factor that determines the use, and effectiveness, of an enforcement regime is the amount 
of benefits to costs which it offers. This is known as the cost- benefit approach to decision 
making.155  
Costs and benefits in this regard may be understood in two different senses. The first is the 
public cost and benefit of the enforcement regime to the society while the second is the private 
cost and benefit of enforcement to the enforcer. The public benefits of enforcing directors’ 
duties may include greater deterrence, enhanced compliance, increased investments, stronger 
capital markets and overall improved corporate governance. On the other hand, the public costs 
of enforcement may include the financial costs of investigating and enforcing, possible 
reduction in the willingness of qualified persons to take up executive positions, and negative 
publicity potentially affecting the market.  
The private benefits of enforcement of directors duties include corporate recovery by the 
company i.e. compensation, deterrence, greater returns to shareholders and possible reduction 
in agency costs.  The private costs of enforcement include the monetary expenses, time spent 
in pursuing the enforcement action and the potential negative publicity for the company. It 
would also include the chilling effect of the enforcement action on directors causing them to 
be more risk averse, the possibility of ‘soured future relations’ with the erring directors,156 and 
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the potential reduction in the pool of qualified persons willing to act as directors due to fears 
of potential sanction.  
Although there are clear areas of interplay between the two, some tension may occur between 
the public and private costs and benefits of enforcement.  Public benefits of enforcement do 
not always translate to private benefits for the enforcer and company. An enforcement action 
may offer immense public benefits in terms of enhanced general deterrence and increased 
compliance with the relevant rules and standards. It may nevertheless offer little private benefit 
to the company or may indeed be detrimental to it.  Similarly, a private enforcement action 
may be costly to the company and its shareholders, while being socially beneficial due to its 
general deterrent effect. In this instance, there is an obvious conflict between the public benefits 
and the private benefits of enforcement.  Consequently, private enforcers in the company will 
often calculate, and be mostly concerned with, the private benefits and costs of enforcement.  
The problem occasioned by the costs of enforcement affects the private enforcement regime in 
its entirety. Litigation is expensive;157 the costs of litigation have therefore been the subject of 
much discourse over the years.158 In private civil litigation, there is evidence which suggests 
that litigation costs can exceed the amount received by a successful claimant.159 Consequently, 
several scholars have argued that litigation, including shareholder actions, should be viewed as 
an investment decision.160 The resources to be invested include time and money while the future 
results would include recovery of compensation and deterrence of future misconduct.  A key 
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factor which determines potential claimants’ decision to sue is therefore whether the potential 
private benefits are likely to outweigh the costs of litigation.161  
Generally, a company is unlikely to sue a director unless a substantial amount is at stake.162 
Consequently, where a director’s breach, and potential recovery, is considered insignificant,163 
the board of directors are likely to view litigation as an unworthy venture. Similarly, where the 
chances of success are low, litigation becomes extremely unattractive for the board.164 In 
addition to this, the board may consider the potential non-financial costs of enforcement in 
terms of the attendant negative publicity, valuable time expended, and the chilling effect on 
other directors. They may therefore calculate that the costs of enforcement outweigh its 
benefits.  
 The cost problem is particularly evident in derivative actions due to the lack of direct benefits 
for claimant shareholders as discussed in the previous section.  A rational shareholder would 
only expend the effort needed to bring enforcement action where the expected benefits exceed 
the costs.165 Generally, however, on a cost-benefit scale, the costs of bringing derivative actions 
are likely to outweigh its potential benefits.  This problem is further exacerbated by the fact 
that in many common law jurisdictions such as the UK and Nigeria, losing is more costly due 
to the ‘losers pay’ rule.166 Shareholders are therefore likely to be deterred by the potential 
monetary costs of enforcement.  
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It is worth mentioning that both the UK and Nigeria make provision for reimbursing 
shareholders for costs incurred in bringing derivative actions.167 However, in both countries, 
the court’s power to order indemnification for costs is discretionary. Similarly, the availability 
of indemnity cost orders generally does not provide any incentive for shareholders to bring 
derivative actions.  Hence, while it is sometimes believed that indemnity cost orders can 
provide a substantial incentive to use derivative actions,168 this is not the case. 169 As argued 
by Reisberg, the view that indemnity cost orders can increase shareholders’ incentive to litigate 
‘ignores the realities of derivative action litigation’.170 He further argues that an indemnity cost 
order does not cure the funding problem neither does it provide a strong incentive to litigate.  
Asides from the monetary costs, litigation may also impose unforeseen costs. Litigation may 
take up valuable management time and distract key personnel.171  The company may have to 
find a replacement for the wrongdoing director, if necessary. Similarly, litigation may increase 
the costs of attracting new directors. It could also deter legitimate risk taking thereby adversely 
affecting profit maximisation.172 The potential costs of private enforcement may therefore 
significantly outweigh the potential benefits. This deters private enforcers from bringing claims 
and limits the efficacy of the private enforcement regime.  
4. Procedural Rules for Derivative proceedings 
Another weakness of the private enforcement regime is the procedural rules governing 
derivative proceedings. While derivative proceedings are just one strand of the private 
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enforcement regime, they nevertheless represent a key enforcement mechanism.173 Hence, the 
problems occasioned by the procedural rules governing derivative proceedings are worth 
discussing in their own right.174 
Due to the nature of derivative proceedings, controls and checks in form of procedural rules 
are often introduced to prevent frivolous litigation. The Law Commission, for example, in its 
report on shareholder remedies recommended ‘tight judicial controls’ at all stages of the 
statutory derivative claims process.175 These sorts of controls are beneficial in preventing 
abuse. However, in certain cases, they operate to hinder the effectiveness of derivative 
proceedings as an enforcement mechanism. This is evident from the UK and Nigerian 
experience. 
In the UK, as a response to the inadequacies of the common law regime,176 the Law 
Commission recommended that there should be a new derivative procedure with ‘more 
modern, flexible and accessible criteria’ for determining when shareholders should be able to 
bring derivative actions.177  This resulted in the statutory derivative claims regime set out in 
part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. However, while the statutory regime represents an 
improvement on the previous common law era,178 potential claimants still need to overcome 
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the procedural hurdles imposed by the Act. Section 263 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
contains both mandatory and discretionary factors which the court should consider in 
determining whether permission to continue a derivative claim should be granted. It is worth 
noting that this list is not exhaustive and the court may consider other factors in determining 
whether to grant permission to continue the claim. Similarly, judicial discretion remains a key 
part of the regime; resulting in a significant amount of uncertainty.179 In light of this, it has 
been argued that the procedural obstacles to continuing derivative claims under the UK 
statutory regime are similar to those which existed under the common law thereby reducing 
accessibility to this enforcement mechanism.180 
The Nigerian experience in this regard is arguably worse than the UK. The Nigerian rules on 
derivative actions are codified in the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA). These 
rules have already been the subject of in-depth analysis, and criticisms, by a range of 
commentators.181 There is no need to repeat what has already been said.  Generally, however, 
criticisms of Nigeria’s derivative action regime include its retention of the common law 
wrongdoer control requirement, the lack of clarity in the scope of wrongs covered, its treatment 
of litigation costs, and the uncertainty in its provisions.182  
CAMA imposes requirements which potential claimants must fulfil in order to bring derivative 
actions.183 Some of these requirements such as the wrongdoer control and the notice 
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requirement however act as pitfalls to shareholders in their quest to enforce directors’ duties.  
Consequently, the likelihood of a shareholder successfully bringing a derivative action in 
Nigeria is extremely low. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that since the codification of 
the rules governing derivative actions in Nigeria more than two decades ago, this enforcement 
mechanism has barely been used by shareholders.184 It is therefore evident that the procedural 
rules governing derivative proceedings act as an impediment to its use thereby preventing this 
enforcement mechanism from providing any deterrence or compensatory benefits.  
 
5. General unsuitability for countries with weak judicial systems 
Asides from the specific weaknesses of the private enforcement regime, one general weakness 
of the regime is its unsuitability for countries with weak judicial systems. Due to its nature, the 
private enforcement regime depends significantly on a well-functioning and efficient judicial 
system. While this is not a problem in itself, it substantially prevents effective enforcement in 
countries with weak judicial systems. Nigeria provides a classic case.  
Black and Kraakman, in their article on the self-enforcing model of corporate law, highlight 
the weaknesses of formal enforcement particularly for emerging countries.  A weak judicial 
system is pinpointed as the most significant factor limiting enforcement in such countries.185 
Some of the problems identified include cumbersome judicial procedures, overburdened court 
system, lack of judicial experience and corruption. In countries where these problems are 
prevalent, judicial enforcement of corporate law will fail.186 While Black and Kraakman’s 
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analysis relates specifically to enforcement of corporate law in Russia, Nigeria shares these 
difficulties.  
The inefficiencies of the Nigerian judicial system have been the subject of much discussion.187 
The Nigerian judiciary is plagued with several problems which impede its ability to efficiently 
administer justice. One of the key problems is corruption. Corruption is a general issue in 
Nigeria;188 however, available evidence suggests that the judicial system is not spared from 
this problem.189 Judicial corruption exists in some form in many countries of the world;190 in 
Nigeria however, it has been described as a common feature of the judicial system.191  
 Lack of judicial independence is also a problem in Nigeria. The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria provides that money belonging to the judiciary in the consolidated revenue 
fund should be paid directly to the National Judicial Council or heads of courts, as 
appropriate.192 The executive arms of government however often breach this provision and 
have been reluctant to recognize the judiciary’s financial independence.193 Judges are also 
liable to political influence and pressure from the executive and legislative arms of 
government.194   
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 In addition to corruption and lack of judicial independence, Nigeria’s judicial system is also 
faced with other problems which reduce its ability to effectively administer justice. These 
problems include delay in the judicial process,195  strike actions, understaffing, underfunding, 
and lack of necessary equipment and IT facilities.196 Consequently, potential claimants are 
faced with the prospect that litigation against a wrongdoing director may be unduly influenced 
by the directors themselves or last several years. Similarly, the courts may lack the facilities 
required to effectively determine the case. These factors may discourage private enforcement 
actions and therefore have a domino effect on the efficacy of the enforcement regime in 
countries that have similar problems.   
 
6.  Inadequate deterrence 
A final weakness of the private enforcement regime is that it offers inadequate deterrence.  The 
deterrence hypothesis has been discussed earlier on in this article. Two  key factors have been 
shown to determine deterrence.197 The first is the certainty of punishment. It is argued that the 
greater the likelihood that punishment will be imposed, the higher the deterrent effect of that 
punishment. The second factor is the severity of punishment. It is said that to ensure its 
effectiveness, punishment should be sufficiently severe and proportionate to the offence.198   
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Based on these key factors, there are two main reasons why the private enforcement regime 
offers inadequate deterrence. First, the certainty of punishment offered by the regime is low 
due to the fact that, as discussed, it suffers from several weaknesses. These weaknesses have a 
dual negative effect. They reduce incidences of private enforcement actions and, where 
instituted, they reduce claimant’s chances of success. These invariably reduce the likelihood 
that a director will suffer any detriment or penalty as a result of the existence of the private 
enforcement regime.   
Second, the penalties provided by the private enforcement regime generally offer low severity. 
Private law in many countries restricts punitive damages in civil proceedings. This is mostly 
due to the absence of sufficient protection for defendants in such proceedings compared to 
criminal trials.199 Hence, for private enforcement actions in respect of directors’ breaches, the 
courts do not impose punitive damages neither do they increase the penalties imposed as a way 
of compensating for the often low risk of apprehension.200  Private enforcement actions 
therefore generally only cancel the gain that directors intending to benefit at the company’s 
expense could have made.201 A classic example of this is seen in the case of Re Produce 
Marketing Consortium Ltd202   where Knox J held that the court’s jurisdiction under s214 of 
the UK Insolvency Act 1986 was ‘primarily compensatory not penal’. Therefore, the amount 
the director was liable to contribute was limited to the amount by which the company’s assets 
had depleted by the director’s conduct. Damages in such cases are therefore often restricted to 
compensating the company for any losses suffered. The wrongdoing director remains in the 
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same position he would have been if the wrong had not been committed. The director therefore, 
arguably, has little to lose from an award of judgement.  
This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that, as noted previously in this article, directors 
rarely suffer out-of-pocket losses from litigation brought against them.203 Consequently, there 
is limited deterrence.  A critic of this viewpoint could argue that while wrongdoing directors 
may not suffer financial detriment from   private enforcement actions, they  suffer social stigma 
or shame which in itself is a significant penalty with attendant deterrence.204  It can be further 
argued that this stigma penalty may even deter misconduct at other companies as well.205 The 
problem with this argument however is that private enforcement actions, in reality, often 
produce very little stigma or shame. Publicity is a core element of the stigma penalty,206 
however private enforcement actions are often kept in the private sphere. Therefore, while 
enforcement actions by regulators are likely to attract significant publicity and moral 
condemnation, the same cannot be said of private enforcement actions. Even where a private 
enforcement action is able to garner publicity, it may be perceived by the public as a mere 
internal disagreement between directors and shareholders.207 It will therefore offer limited 
stigma and deterrence.   
Conclusion 
Directors’ duties are an essential means of providing checks on those who control companies. 
The functionality of these duties however significantly depends on the effectiveness of 
available enforcement mechanisms.  As noted by Keay, ‘The prescription of duties can educate 
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and set norms of conduct, but unless there is some form of effective enforcement there is, 
arguably, no deterrence which is often regarded as an important element of any prescriptive 
requirements’.208 Similarly, it has been said that a right without a remedy is of no value.209 
Consequently, directors’ duties ought to be accompanied by an effective external disciplinary 
mechanism.  
This article has examined the weaknesses of the private enforcement regime, a key disciplinary 
mechanism in corporate law. It identified compensation and deterrence as the main purposes 
of enforcement of corporate law. It noted that in determining the effectiveness of an 
enforcement regime, the crucial question is whether it is able to adequately meet a deterrence, 
and, or compensatory purpose. In order to achieve this, however, the enforcement regime must 
be put to effective use and offer reasonable prospects of success.   
The discussion in this article has revealed that the private enforcement regime in corporate law 
suffers from several weaknesses.  These weaknesses have the effect of significantly deterring 
private parties from bringing enforcement actions against directors. This in turn hinders the 
private enforcement regime from successfully providing both deterrence and compensatory 
benefits thereby rendering it wholly ineffective.  Consequently, in jurisdictions such as Nigeria 
which rely on private enforcement for breach of directors’ duties, there is need for a 
complementary enforcement regime.  The Australian civil penalty regime provides a potential 
model in this regard. The success of Australia’s public enforcement regime for breach of 
directors’ duties has been the subject of discussion among various commentators.210  An 
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analysis of how an Australian-type public enforcement regime can benefit Nigeria however 
merits in-depth consideration.211 It therefore falls within the scope of a separate article.  
A final note; the weaknesses of the private enforcement regime have been discussed within the 
context of a theoretical framework. No empirical data on the private enforcement regime has 
been used. This perhaps represents a limitation of this article. A future empirical study of 
private enforcement actions, particularly within the Nigerian context, would therefore be 
particularly useful in providing further insight into the weaknesses of the private enforcement 
regime.  
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